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Abstract
We present new empirical evidence that aggregate capital accumula-
tion is strongly inuenced by the user cost of capital and, in particular,
by corporate tax incentives summarised in the tax-adjusted user cost.
We use sectoral panel data for the USA, Japan, Australia and eleven
EU countries over the period 1982-2007. Our panel combines data on
capital stocks, value-added and relative prices from the EU KLEMS
database with measures of e¤ective corporate tax rates from the Oxford
University Centre for Business Taxation. Our results for equipment in-
vestment are particularly robust, and strikingly consistent with the basic
economic theory of corporate investment.
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1 Introduction
The impacts of corporate taxation on aggregate investment in the short run and
on capital accumulation in the long run are central to any evaluation of the welfare
implications of taxes on corporate income. Reliable evidence on the nature and
magnitude of these e¤ects is also important for the design of scal incentives that
are intended to stimulate private sector business investment.
Previous empirical research presents a wide range of conicting evidence.1 Stud-
ies which rely on aggregate data for individual countries face the problem that sig-
nicant corporate tax reforms are infrequent, so there may be too few experiments
in the data from which to learn about the e¤ects of tax changes. The timing of
tax reforms may also confound the analysis, particularly if measures which are in-
tended to stimulate investment tend to be introduced at times when investment is
depressed for other reasons. We address these concerns by pooling data from 14
developed countries, and by paying careful attention to the possible endogeneity of
our tax measures.2
The main innovation in this study is to combine two recently developed cross-
country panel datasets to provide the basis for our empirical analysis. These are the
1See, for example, Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) and Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer
(1999). Hassett and Hubbard (2002) provide a useful survey of this literature.
2Studies which consider di¤erential responses of di¤erent rms to the same tax reform (depend-
ing on how their cost of capital is a¤ected) avoid these problems, but tend to focus on short-run
responses. See, for example, Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994, 1996).
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EU KLEMS database, which provides comparable data on capital stocks, output
and relative prices at the sectoral level for the USA, Japan, Australia and most of the
EU countries; and the corporate tax database developed at the Oxford University
Centre for Business Taxation, which provides detailed information on corporate tax
regimes for these countries. Combining these sources and focusing on countries with
data available before 1995 gives us annual observations for up to 27 sectors in 14
OECD countries, over the period 1982-2007.
We consider a standard econometric model of investment, in which the sectoral
capital-output ratio depends inversely in the long run on the tax-adjusted user cost
of capital, and in which short-run adjustment dynamics as well as the magnitude of
the long-run user cost elasticity are estimated from the data. We present empirical
estimates using an eclectic range of econometric methods, allowing for heterogeneity
in parameters across investment in di¤erent types of assets and across investment in
di¤erent sectors and di¤erent countries. Our main ndings are strikingly consistent
with the basic economic theory of corporate investment, suggesting large e¤ects of
tax incentives on long-run capital accumulation. This nding is particularly robust
for equipment investment, and less robust for investment in structures. Speci-
cations which allow for cross-sectional parameter heterogeneity also suggest quite
rapid adjustment of capital stocks to changes in the user cost of capital.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briey outlines the
basic neoclassical investment model. Section 3 presents the data that we use in our
empirical analysis. Section 4 describes our econometric specication, and section 5
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presents our empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Investment model
Our econometric model is based on the value-maximising investment behaviour of
a rm with a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production technology and
an isoelastic demand schedule. We assume that investment in year t adds to the
stock of productive capital in the same year, which depreciates at the constant rate
. In the absence of any adjustment costs, the optimal capital stock in year t (Kt )
can be expressed as:3
Kt = Q
(+ 1 v )
t C
 
t (1)
where Qt is value-added and Ct is the user cost of capital. The parameters  and
 are respectively the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour and the
returns to scale in the production function, and  also depends on the production
function parameters.
If we assume that the marginal investment is nanced using retained earnings,
and that the corporate income tax rate ( t), other parameters of the tax system,
relative prices and ination rates are expected to remain constant over time, the
user cost of capital can be expressed as:
Ct =
PKt
Pt

1  1

 (1  At)
(1   t)
(rt + )
(1 + rt)
(2)
3Appendix A provides details.
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where PKt is the price of capital goods, Pt is the price of output, At is the net
present value of current and future tax depreciation allowances associated with a
unit of investment in year t, rt is the real discount rate, and  is the price elasticity
of demand.
If we assume instead that the marginal investment is nanced by borrowing at
the nominal interest rate it, and that interest payments are tax-deductible, the user
cost of capital can be expressed as:
CDebtt = Ct

1  Jt
Mt

(3)
where
Jt = [t   it(1   t)](1   tt) and Mt = (1  At) (rt + ) (1 + t):
Here t is the expected rate of ination, t = (1 + rt)(1 + t)   1 is the nominal
discount rate, and t is the fraction of a unit of investment in year t that can be
deducted from the corporate income tax base in the same year.4 The extra term
1  Jt
Mt

reects the tax advantage of debt nance in a conventional corporate
income tax. Conveniently this extra term enters the user cost of capital multiplica-
tively, so that the impact of this tax advantage for debt on investment behaviour
can be investigated by the inclusion of an additional linear term in econometric
specications based on taking logarithms of equation (1).
Before considering further details of our econometric specication, we rst present
the datasets used in this study, and illustrate the variation over time and across
4So that only the fraction 1   tt has to be nanced by borrowing.
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countries in our measures of some of the key variables suggested by this basic the-
oretical framework.
3 Data
We combine sector-level panel data on production, investment and price variables
obtained from the EU KLEMS database with tax variables provided by the Oxford
University Centre for Businss Taxation.5 Our merged dataset includes data for 14
OECD countries covering the period 1982-2007.6 Our main sample consists of 11
sectors within manufacturing for each of these countries. For comparison, we also
present results for a broader sample of 19 sectors, excluding nancial intermediation,
utilities, and other sectors with substantial public sector inuence, as well as results
for the complete sample of 27 sectors available in the EU KLEMS database, covering
the whole economy. The sectors included in each of these samples are listed in
Appendix B.
5More information on the EU KLEMS data is provided by OMahony and Timmer (2009).
More details on the construction of the tax variables can be found in Devereux, Gri¢ th and
Klemm (2002) and Loretz (2008). We thank Simon Loretz for providing updated series for use in
this study.
6These 14 countries are: Australia, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. We
exclude countries for which data becomes available only after 1995. The time coverage for each
country is listed in Appendix B.
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3.1 Capital stock and output
A major advantage of the EU KLEMS data is that this provides comparable capi-
tal stock measures for 8 di¤erent types of assets across sectors and countries, con-
structed using a common Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). We exclude residen-
tial structures from the total capital stock reported in EU KLEMS, as residential
housing is not primarily used as a direct input into production in the business sector.
The remaining types of capital assets are aggregated into three broad categories,
namely, equipment, structures, and other assets.7
The real capital stock (Kk;t) for asset k is dened as a weighted sum of past real
investments (measured in 1995 prices) with weights given by the relative e¢ ciencies
of capital goods at di¤erent ages according to the formula below (sector and country
subscripts are suppressed for convenience):8
Kk;t =
1X
=0
k;Ik;t  =
1X
=0
(1  k)Ik;t  = (1  k)Kk;t 1 + Ik;t (4)
where Ik;t  is real investment in asset k in year t    and k; = (1   k) is the
e¢ ciency of a capital good of age  relative to the e¢ ciency of a new capital good,
assuming a constant rate of depreciation k for each asset type k. The depreciation
rates k are obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). They di¤er
7Equipment includes transport equipment, computing equipment, communications equipment,
and other machinery and equipment. Structures refers to non-residential structures. Other assets
include software and others.
8For more details on the implementation of the Perpetual Inventory Method to construct the
real capital stock series in the EU KLEMS database, see Timmer et al. (2007).
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by asset type and sector, but are assumed to be common across countries and
constant over time for a particular type of asset in a particular sector.9
As a comparison, in Appendix C (Figure C.1), we plot the time series of the
total real capital stock for total manufacturing industry over the period 1982-2007
for 11 countries for which this information is available in both the EU KLEMS and
the OECD STAN databases. Figure C.1 reveals that these two measures of the real
capital stock for the manufacturing sector in these countries are close in magnitude
and they also show similar patterns over time.10
We use the real value-added measure of output from EU KLEMS, also measured
in 1995 prices. Figure 1 plots the time series of the average capital-output ratio
in logarithms (ln(K=Q)), separately for equipment and structures, for our sample
of manufacturing industries.11 Over time, there is an upward trend in the capital-
output ratio for equipment. In contrast, the capital-output ratio for structures
declined towards the end of the sample period.
9An advantage of using the BEA depreciation rates is that the depreciation patterns are based
on empirical evidence about used asset prices in resale markets wherever possible.
10Advantages of the EU KLEMS database over the OECD STAN database for our study are
that the former provides real capital stock measures disaggregated by asset type, and covers more
countries.
11Each series here, and in Figures 2-4 below, is calculated as the unweighted average of the log
of the corresponding variable for all 11 manufacturing sectors in all countries for which data is
available for that year. The sample covers all 14 countries between 1995 and 2006.
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3.2 Relative price of investment goods
EU KLEMS also provides, for each sector in each country, the price index for
gross xed capital formation (by asset type) and the price index for value-added.
The ratio of these two indices provides a measure of the price of investment goods
relative to the price of output. The base years for these price indices are both
1995.12 Figure 2 shows the average relative price of investment goods in logarithms
(lnPK=P ), separately for equipment and structures, over the sample period.
A striking feature shown in Figure 2 is that, while the relative price of equip-
ment assets declined gradually from the middle of the 1990s, the relative price of
structures remained stable until the late 1990s and then began to increase sharply.13
3.3 The tax component of the user cost of capital
The tax component of the user cost of capital, (1 A)
(1 ) , reects varying tax rules and
tax rates in di¤erent countries and over time. Data on the statutory corporate
income tax rates () and the net present value (NPV ) of depreciation allowances
12As the base year is 1995 for all price indices, di¤erences in the level of relative prices between
countries and sectors are not fully reected in these measures. This provides one motivation for
including country-sector specic xed e¤ects in our specications, as the xed e¤ects can control
for price level di¤erences across countries and sectors in the base year.
13The declining relative price of equipment is documented in other studies, such as Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) and Hsieh and Klenow (2005). The rapid increase in the relative
price of structures is observed in almost every country in our sample since the late 1990s, and is
particularly evident in Australia, Czech Republic, Spain, Sweden and the United States.
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(A) are provided by the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. The NPV
of depreciation allowances varies across countries and over time with di¤erences in
ination rates reected in the nominal discount rate used in the calculation.14 The
NPV of depreciation allowances also varies across di¤erent types of assets. Owing
to the availability of data, we restrict ourselves to three main categories: equipment,
structures, and others.
For total capital, the tax component of the user cost of capital is a weighted
average of those for the three di¤erent asset types. The weights are the proportions
of each asset in the total capital stock. These weights di¤er across sectors and
countries, and also vary over time. The cross-sectional variation relies on di¤erent
asset structures within each sector (di¤erent combinations of equipment, structures
and other assets) as well as the cross-country variation in the tax rules (NPV of
depreciation allowances and the corporate income tax rate) and the ination rate
in a particular year. The time-series variation comes from the changes in asset
structures within each sector over time, and also changes in the tax rules and
ination rates over time. For equipment assets or structures respectively, both the
cross-sectional and time-series variation in the tax component of the user cost of
capital rely only on the variation in tax rules and ination rates. Pooling this tax
14The one-period nominal discount rate (1 + t) between year t and year t + 1 is constructed
as (1 + rt)(1 + t), where the real interest rate (rt) is assumed xed at 10% and the expected
ination rate (t) is assumed to be the actual CPI ination rate between year t   1 and year t.
The s-period nominal discount factor between year t and year t+ s is constructed as (1 + t)
 s.
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data across countries provides rich variation in the tax component of the user cost
of capital, which greatly facilitates the identication of the e¤ects of tax incentives
on capital accumulation.
Figure 3 shows the time series for the average tax component of the user cost of
capital in logarithms (ln 1 A
1  ), separately for equipment and structures. For both
types of assets, developments in tax rates and in tax rules over this period tended
to lower the user cost of capital. The average level of the tax component of the user
cost for equipment assets remained lower than that for structures throughout the
period, which reects the more generous tax depreciation allowances available for
equipment.15
In Figure 4 we combine these two components of the user cost of capital and plot
both average ln(K=Q) and average ln P
K
P
(1 A)
(1 ) for total capital and for equipment.
Similar graphs for each country are provided in Appendix D. In Figure 4, we observe
a negative correlation between the capital-output ratio and these components of the
user cost of capital, which is broadly consistent with the basic theory of investment
outlined in section 2. This pattern is also observed in many individual countries in
the sample.
15The broad pattern observed in the sample average data also holds for most individual countries.
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4 Specication
We assume initially that investment is nanced by retained earnings.16 We also
assume that the real discount rate component of the user cost of capital does not
vary signicantly across sectors and countries, or at least across sectors within each
country, so that variation in real interest rates can be controlled for using year
dummies, or using a set of year dummies for each country.17 Combining equations
(1) and (2), and taking logarithms of both sides, we then obtain a convenient log-
linear relation between the desired level of the capital stock (in the absence of
adjustment costs or frictions), output, and the tax-adjusted user cost of capital:
lnKt = ln + ( +
1  
v
) lnQt    lnCt (5)
= t + ( +
1  
v
) lnQt    lnUCt
where
t = ln +  ln

1  1


   ln (rt + )
(1 + rt)
and
lnUCt = ln

PKt
Pt

+ ln

1  At
1   t

combines the measured relative price and tax components of the user cost.
Following Bloom (2000) and Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2007), we rely on
16Studies of nancing patterns suggest that, in aggregate, most corporate investment is nanced
internally in developed countries. See, for example, Corbett and Jenkinson (1997).
17More precisely, our specications will allow for time-invariant heterogeneity across sectors and
countries in this component of the user cost, through country-sector specic xed e¤ects.
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cointegration between the logarithm of the actual capital stock (lnKt) and the log-
arithm of this frictionless capital stock, which holds for any nite adjustment costs.
The dynamic adjustment of lnKt can then be represented by an Error Correction
Model (ECM), of the form:
a (L)4 lnKt = b (L)4 lnKt   
 
lnKt k   lnKt k

+ et (6)
where a (L) and b (L) are polynomials in the lag operator, the order of which will be
determined empirically, and et is a stationary error term. The parameter  reects
the speed of adjustment of the capital stock towards its long-run target, which is
proportional (but not necessarily equal) to the frictionless optimum. The Error
Correction Model, which was rst used in the empirical investment literature by
Bean (1981), nests the partial adjustment and accelerator models as special cases.
This specication also has the advantage of separating the long-run determinants
of the level of the capital stock from the short-run adjustment dynamics.
After experimenting with di¤erent lag lengths, our main specication for the
capital stock in sector i in country c in year t has the form:
4 lnKi;c;t =   (lnKi;c;t 2   1 lnQi;c;t 2   2 lnUCi;c;t 2) (7)
+04 lnKi;c;t 1 + 14 lnQi;c;t + 24 lnQi;c;t 1
 34 lnUCi;c;t   44 lnUCi;c;t 1 + dt + fi;c + "i;c;t
where dt denotes a year dummy and fi;c denotes a time-invariant xed e¤ect for
sector i in country c. The long-run elasticities of the capital stock with respect
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to output and the user cost are 1 =  + 1 v and 2 =   respectively. In
most specications we impose the constant returns to scale restriction ( = 1), in
which case we have 1 = 1 and 2 measures the long-run elasticity of the capital-
output ratio with respect to the user cost. In addition to reporting estimates of this
baseline specication for total capital, we will present separate models for equipment
and structures, consider relaxing the constant returns to scale restriction, allow for
possible endogeneity of the user cost of capital, allow the relative price and tax
components of the user cost to a¤ect capital accumulation in di¤erent ways, explore
whether there is additional information in the extra term in the user cost of capital
for debt-nanced investment,18 or in other tax measures, and allow for heterogeneity
in the estimated parameters across countries and sectors.
5 Results
5.1 Time series properties
We use standard estimation and inference methods for regression models which,
given the long time series dimension of our panels, require the variables to be sta-
tionary. This is one motivation for imposing the constant returns to scale restriction
in our baseline model, and working with the log of the capital-output ratio rather
than the logs of the capital stock and output variables individually.
Table E.1 in Appendix E presents the results of formal tests of the null hypothesis
18See equation (3).
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that these series are non-stationary (integrated of order one). We report results for
the Fisher-type panel unit root test proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999), which is
suitable for unbalanced panels and allows for heterogeneous slope coe¢ cients across
the observations for each country-sector pair.19 Focusing on the specication which
allows for common year e¤ects and country-sector specic linear trends, we nd
that the logs of the capital stock and output series appear to be non-stationary
(I(1)), while the log of the capital-output ratio and the remaining variables used in
our model appear to be stationary (I(0)).20 As always, the results of these formal
unit root tests should be interpreted with caution.
5.2 Baseline specications
Table 1 presents the results of estimating equation (7) using our main sample of 11
manufacturing industries in 14 countries.21 Columns 1-3 present the results for total
capital, equipment and structures, respectively. Panel A reports the basic estimated
coe¢ cients and cluster-robust standard errors. Panel B reports the implied long-run
elasticities of capital-output ratios with respect to the user cost of capital. Panel
19The tests are computed using the command xtsher in Stata. The test procedure is outlined
in the note to Table E.1.
20An exception is found for the log of the relative price term for structures; although curiously,
not for the log of the measured components of the user cost for structures (which includes this
relative price term).
21In Table 1 and the following tables, the subscripts i and c are suppressed. These results are
computed using the xed e¤ects option of the command xtreg in Stata.
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C reports tests of the null hypothesis that the long-run elasticity of capital with
respect to output is unity (imposed here), and that the long-run user cost elasticity
is equal to unity in absolute value (not imposed here). This specication includes
a set of year dummies to control for common time e¤ects.
Consistent with the basic neoclassical investment model outlined in section 2, we
estimate a negative long-run user cost elasticity (2) which is signicantly di¤erent
from zero, but not signicantly di¤erent from -1, in all three columns. These re-
sults are thus consistent with the Cobb-Douglas special case of the CES production
function. The short-run e¤ects of changes in the user cost are also found to be sig-
nicantly di¤erent from zero, and in the same direction as the long-run e¤ect.22 We
also nd statistically signicant but rather slow adjustment of actual capital stocks
towards their long-run target levels, as indicated by the low absolute values of the
estimated coe¢ cients (-) on the term ln(K=Q)t 2. Nevertheless, the adjustment
process is somewhat faster for equipment than for structures.
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (7) using the same sample,
without restricting the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to output to be
unity. This restriction is formally rejected in all three columns, albeit only mar-
ginally in the case of equipment. The long-run elasticity of capital with respect
to the user cost remains negative and signicantly di¤erent from zero in all three
22For example, for equipment investment, we estimate that about 10 per cent of the long-run
e¤ect of a reduction in the user cost occurs in the rst year. The impact e¤ect is much smaller
for structures.
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cases. The restriction that this long-run user cost elasticity is -1 is now rejected in
the case of structures, but not in the case of equipment, and only marginally for
the total capital specication.
Table 3 adds a full set of country-sector specic linear trends to the baseline
specication from Table 1.23 Again we estimate highly signicant, negative, long-
run user cost elasticities in all three cases. The estimated speeds of capital stock
adjustment are noticeably faster in this specication.
Tables E.2 and E.3 in Appendix E present estimates of our baseline (Table 1)
specication using broader samples of industries. The sample of 19 industries used
in Table E.2 excludes nancial services and sectors where public sector investment
is likely to be important, while the sample used in Table E.3 includes all 27 sectors
covered in the EU KLEMS database.24 In both cases we continue to nd highly
signcant, negative, long-run elasticities of the capital-output ratio with respect to
the user cost; and for equipment investment, we do not reject the hypothesis that
this elasticity is unity in absolute value.
5.3 Decomposing the user cost of capital
We are particularly interested in the e¤ects of corporate taxation on capital accumu-
lation, which are summarised in our baseline specication by the tax component of
23This specication is thus consistent with the results from our preferred unit root tests in
Table E.1, which also included country-sector specic linear trends. The constant returns to scale
restriction is imposed here, and in all subsequent tables.
24Appendix B provides details of the sectors included in each of these samples.
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the user cost of capital. The basic neoclassical investment model outlined in section
2 suggests that the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to di¤erent compo-
nents of the user cost should be the same. We can test this restriction by estimating
separate (short-run and long-run) coe¢ cients for our two measured components of
the user cost, namely ln

PK
P

and ln
 
1 A
1 

.25
Table 4 presents results for this extended specication using our main sample of
11 manufacturing industries. For both total capital and for equipment investment,
we estimate highly signicant, negative, long-run elasticities for both the relative
price and tax components of the user cost; these elasticities are close to -1, and we
do not reject the restriction of equal long-run elasticities for both components of
the user cost. For structures, however, we estimate a signicant, negative long-run
elasticity (close to -1) only for the relative price component of the user cost, and
nd no signicant e¤ect of the tax component.
At least for equipment investment, these results lend support to the view that
using corporate tax incentives to lower the marginal cost of investment can stimulate
capital accumulation in the long run. The estimated long-run elasticities for the
tax component of the user cost in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 are considerably
larger than those reported in Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999), and close to the
estimates suggested by earlier studies using US rm-level data, such as Cummins,
Hassett and Hubbard (1994) and Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995).
25The latter term is labelled lnTAX in Table 4 and later tables.
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5.4 Additional tax variables
The basic neoclassical investment theory also suggests that the e¤ects of corporate
taxes on capital accumulation are summarised by this tax component of the user cost
of capital.26 For discrete investment choices, such as the decision by a multinational
corporation to locate a plant of xed size in one country rather than another, the
e¤ects of taxation on investment outcomes are likely to be di¤erent. Devereux
and Gri¢ th (1998, 2003) develop an e¤ective average tax rate (EATR) measure to
summarise the impact of corporate taxes on such discrete investment choices, and
show that this measure helps to explain the location choices of US multinationals
setting up new plants within Europe. The e¤ective average tax rate is a measure
of the di¤erence between the net present value of a given, protable investment
project in the presence and in the absence of corporate taxation. This measure
could also be important for sector-level investment, if a substantial proportion of
sectoral investment takes the form of location decisions or other discrete choices,
and such investments add to, rather than displace, other forms of investment.
To investigate this, we add further (short-run and long-run) terms in the e¤ec-
tive average tax rate to our previous specication used in Table 4. We also consider
adding further terms in the statutory corporate tax rate ().27 Table 5 summarises
26The e¤ects of corporate taxation can also be summarised by considering the di¤erence between
the user cost in the presence and in the absence of corporate taxation, as in the e¤ective marginal
tax rate (EMTR) measures developed by King and Fullerton (1984) and Devereux and Gri¢ th
(2003).
27Data on statutory corporate tax rates and on EATRs (separately for equipment and structures)
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the estimated long-run parameters from these extended specications. For equip-
ment investment, we continue to nd signicant negative e¤ects from both the
relative price and the tax components of the user cost of capital, and no signicant
e¤ects from either the e¤ective average tax rate or the statutory corporate tax rate.
For total capital, we also nd signicant, negative e¤ects from both components of
the user cost but, perhaps surprisingly, we also nd signicant, positive long-run ef-
fects from both the e¤ective average and statutory tax rates. For structures, we nd
a similar pattern when the statutory tax rate is included in the specication. These
results suggest that the e¤ects of corporate taxes on sectoral equipment investment
may well be summarised through their e¤ect on the user cost of capital, although
the e¤ects of taxes on sectoral investment in structures may be more complex than
the basic theory suggests.
5.5 Debt nance
To explore whether the lower cost of capital for investment nanced by borrowing
has a signicant impact on sectoral investment, we add further (short-run and
long-run) terms in the additional component of the tax-adjusted user cost of capital
derived for the case in which (marginal) investment is nanced by debt (ln
 
1  J
M

,
dened in equation (3)).28 Table 6 summarises the estimated long-run elasticities
were also obtained from the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. Devereux, Gri¢ th
and Klemm (2002) and Loretz (2008) provide further details on the construction of these measures.
28Our measure of this term sets the nominal interest rate on borrowing (it) equal to the nominal
discount rate (t), which is constructed in the same way described in note 14.
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when these additional terms are included in our baseline specication (Panel A),
and in the extended specication used in Table 4 (Panel B). If we impose the
restriction that the long-run e¤ects of the relative price and tax components of our
baseline user cost measure (derived under the assumption that marginal investment
is nanced only from retained prots) are equal, then there is a suggestion that the
tax advantage for debt nance may result in additional investment in structures.
However this e¤ect becomes insignicant when we relax the restriction of equal
long-run elasticities with respect to the two components of our baseline user cost
measure. We also nd no signicant e¤ect of the additional debt nance term
in either of the specications for total capital or for equipment investment. This
may be consistent with evidence suggesting that only a small share of aggregate
corporate investment is nanced by borrowing.29
5.6 Endogeneity of the user cost of capital
5.6.1 Controlling for country-specic business cycles
Our within-groups estimates of the specications presented above may be inconsis-
tent if any of the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term ("i;c;t) in
equation (7). Of particular concern is the possibility that some changes in tax policy
may be endogenous responses to country-specic business cycle uctuations. For
example, governments may tend to introduce more generous investment incentives
during economic downturns. It has been documented (Kose, Otrok and Whiteman,
29See, for example, Corbett and Jenkinson (1997).
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2003) that country-specic factors, although less important in explaining business
cycles in developed countries than common world factors, were nevertheless im-
portant during some historical episodes. If tax policy responds to country-specic
shocks, simply including a single set of year dummies to control for common time
e¤ects may be insu¢ cient, and the resulting estimates could be inconsistent.
One solution is to include a full set of country-specic year dummies to con-
trol for country-specic factors. This specication also allows for country-specic
variation in real discount rates. Identication of the model parameters then relies
on di¤erential variation over time in the explanatory variables between di¤erent
sectors in the same country, given that we continue to control for country-sector
specic xed e¤ects.
Table 7 presents the results when a full set of country-specic year dummies are
included in our baseline specication. The results are very similar to those reported
in Table 1, suggesting that this source of endogeneity is not a major concern here.
5.6.2 Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation
Another potential concern is that changes in investment demand may a¤ect the
relative price of investment goods, in which case the relative price component of
the user cost could be endogenous.30 Moreover, as we use the price index for
30Schaller (2006) notes that, at the country level, this source of endogeneity is more likely to be
relevant for large economies like the US. For a small open economy, the relative price of investment
goods is likely to be determined by world factors and, therefore, more likely to be exogenous. If
this is also the case for individual sectors in any country, this source of endogeneity may be less
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investment goods to deate the nominal capital stock and the same price index
appears in the numerator of the relative price component of the user cost, there
could be a downward division bias if there are measurement errors in this price
index (Borjas, 1980).
To address these concerns, we present instrumental variables estimates of our
baseline specication. One strategy is to use the tax component of the user cost as
an instrument for the composite user cost term, maintaining the assumption that
country-level tax policy does not respond (rapidly) to investment demand shocks.
Columns 1-3 in Table 8 present 2SLS estimates of our baseline specication, treating
 lnUCt as an endogenous variable, and using current and lagged values of the tax
component of the user cost (4 lnTAXt, lnTAXt 1 and lnTAXt 2) as instrumental
variables.31 As the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions indicates that some
of these instruments may be invalid in the specications for equipment investment
and structures investment, columns 4-6 in Table 8 present 2SLS estimates that use
only lagged values of these tax instruments. The main result of interest is that
we continue to nd highly signicant, negative, long-run user cost elasticities in
all cases, similar to those reported in Table 1, suggesting that endogeneity of the
relative price component of the user cost is not a major concern here.32
important for studies using country-sector data, as we do here.
31These results are computed using the xed e¤ects option of the xtivreg2 command in Stata.
Table E.4 in Appendix E reports the corresponding rst-stage regression results, which conrm
the impression from the formal test statistics that these are informative instruments for  lnUCt.
32We found similar results using longer lags of the user cost term (lnUCt 3; lnUCt 4; lnUCt 5
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5.7 Heterogeneous parameters
The specications reported in the previous sections have allowed the intercept term
in our Error Correction Model to take di¤erent values for each country-sector pair,
but have restricted all the slope parameters to be the same for each country-sector
pair.33 These pooled results could be misleading if this restriction is invalid, and
there is signicant heterogeneity across country-sector pairs in one or more of these
slope parameters.
To address this concern, we report estimates using the Mean Group estimator
for dynamic, heterogeneous panels proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995). We rst
obtain separate OLS estimates of equation (7) for each sector in each country, using
only the time series data for that country-sector pair. We then calculate average val-
ues of the estimated long-run elasticity parameters, averaging across all sectors in all
countries. Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that this approach provides a consistent
estimator of the expected value of the cross-section distribution of these parameters,
whether they are heterogeneous or common. We report an outlier-robust estimate
of the sample means, as suggested by Bond, Leblebicioglu and Schiantarelli (2010).
We also report estimates of the long-run elasticity parameters obtained using the
Pooled Mean Group estimator of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), which allows the
and lnUCt 6) as instruments for  lnUCt, although these instruments appear to be weaker,
particularly in the specications for equipment investment and structures investment. These
results are reported in Tables E.5 and E.6 in Appendix E.
33That is, the parameters ; 1; 2; 0; 1; 2; 3 and 4 in equation (7).
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short-run adjustment parameters ( and the  coe¢ cients) to be heterogeneous but
imposes the restriction that the long-run elasticity (2) is common.
To implement this approach, we consider a more parsimonious specication of
the short-run adjustment dynamics:
4 lnKi;c;t =  

ln
Ki;c;t 2
Qi;c;t 2
  2 lnUCi;c;t 2

+ 04 lnKi;c;t 1 (8)
+14 lnQi;c;t   34 lnUCi;c;t + dt + fi;c + "i;c;t
in which the parameters ; 2; 0; 1 and 3 (as well as the intercept) are allowed to
take heterogeneous values in the Mean Group approach, while the long-run elasticity
2 is imposed to be common in the Pooled Mean Group approach.34 Controlling for
the e¤ect of common shocks is less straightforward when we allow for heterogeneous
slope parameters. We rst consider two simple specications which achieve this only
approximately. One is to estimate the time series models for each country-sector
pair using demeanedvariables, which are expressed as deviations from year-specic
sample means calculated using all the observations available for the same variable
in the same year.35 An extension is to include an additional linear trend term in
each of the time series models estimated using this demeaned data.
Table 9 presents outlier-robust Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group
(PMG) estimates of the average speed of adjustment parameter ( ) and the (av-
34Omitting the terms  lnQi;c;t 1 and  lnUCi;c;t 1 from equation (7) has little e¤ect on the
estimates of the long-run user cost elasticity (2) reported in the preceding sections.
35This approach is equivalent to including a set of year dummies in models with common slope
parameters, but not in models with heterogeneous slope parameters.
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erage) long-run user cost elasticity (2) for our sample of manufacturing industries.36
The average speed of adjustment for a typicalcountry-industry pair is estimated
to be much faster than that suggested by our previous specications with com-
mon slope parameters. The (average) long-run user cost elasticity is estimated to
be somewhat lower in absolute value than that suggested by our previous specica-
tions, particularly for investment in structures. Nevertheless these estimates remain
signicantly di¤erent from zero in all specications.
An alternative to expressing each variable as the deviation from its year-specic
sample mean is to include the year-specic means of the dependent variable and each
of the explanatory variables in equation (8) as additional explanatory variables in
the time series models estimated for each of the country-sector pairs. This approach
gives the common correlated e¤ects(CCE) versions of the Mean Group and Pooled
Mean Group estimators, proposed by Pesaran (2006), which also allow for a form
of cross-section dependence in the error term ("i;c;t). While more general, this
specication requires a longer time series to be available for each of the country-
sector pairs, and even using the more parsimonious dynamic specication introduced
36The PMG results are computed using the xtpmg command in Stata. Code to obtain the outlier-
robust MG results was adapted from that given in Bond et al. (2010). Robust estimates of the
mean value are obtained using the Stata command rreg, giving a weighted mean with lower weights
(wi;c) on individual estimates with more extreme values. Standard errors for these weighted means
are calculated as  =
qP
i;c w
2
i;cb2i;c, where bi;c is the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error
for the parameter in the time series model for sector i in country c.
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in equation (8) is feasible for only 11 of our 14 sample countries.37
Table 10 presents outlier-robust Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group
(PMG) estimates of the average speed of adjustment parameter ( ) and the (av-
erage) long-run user cost elasticity (2) for this more general specication, with and
without additional linear trend terms. For total capital and equipment investment,
the (average) long-run user cost elasticity for a typical country-sector pair remains
negative and signicantly di¤erent from zero, although these estimates suggest a
distribution of elasticities centred around -0.5, rather than -1. For structures, the
Pooled Mean Group estimate of the long-run user cost elasticity remains statisti-
cally signicant but small, while the Mean Group estimate of the average elasticity
becomes insignicantly di¤erent from zero in this specication.
5.8 An illustrative simulation
The e¤ect of standard corporate income taxes is to raise the user cost of capital,
at least for corporate investment nanced from equity sources (retained earnings or
new share issues). We conclude our analysis with a brief illustration of the estimated
e¤ects of eliminating this tax e¤ect on the user cost. This could be achieved by the
introduction of an Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) in an otherwise standard
corporate income tax, or by the replacement of a standard corporate income tax
37The countries omitted from the sample here are Denmark, Finland and the Czech Republic.
For this reason the results in Table 10 are not strictly comparable with those reported in the
previous tables.
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with a form of cash ow tax.38
Averaged across all 11 manufacturing sectors in all 14 of our sample countries,
the e¤ect of eliminating this tax e¤ect in the last year of our sample period in 2007
would have reduced the user cost for equipment investment by 10%. Using the
Pooled Mean Group elasticity estimate in column 3 of Table 9, this reduction in the
user cost would increase the capital-output ratio for equipment assets by 9% in the
long run. Figure 5 shows the estimated adjustment path for the average country-
sector pair, based on the same specication. More than half of the adjustment
occurs within 2 years, and most of the adjustment is complete after 5 years. Slower
adjustment would be suggested by pooled specications, reported in earlier Tables,
which restrict all slope parameters to be homogeneous, but this restriction appears
not to be supported by the data.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents new empirical estimates of the e¤ects of the tax-adjusted user
cost of capital on capital-output ratios, using sectoral panel data covering 14 OECD
countries during the period 1982-2007. For equipment investment, we nd very
robust evidence that aggregate capital accumulation is strongly inuenced by the
38A cash ow tax with expensing of investment sets At =  t and hence (1   At)=(1    t) = 1.
The ACE allowance is equivalent to the expensing treatment in present value terms; see, for
example, Bond and Devereux (2003). Belgium and Italy have recently introduced a form of the
ACE allowance, in 2008 and in 2011 respectively.
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user cost of capital, and specically by the component of the user cost that depends
on corporate taxation through the net present value of tax depreciation allowances
and the statutory corporate tax rate. Our results also suggest that the e¤ects
of corporate taxation on equipment investment are summarised through this tax
component of the user cost of capital. These ndings are strikingly consistent with
the basic economic theory of corporate investment, and support the view that tax
policy can inuence capital accumulation.
For investment in structures, our empirical results are less clear cut. Although
our baseline model suggests a large and signicant long-run user cost elasticity, this
result relies on variation in the relative price component of the user cost, and even
this estimate is less robust than our results for equipment investment. Another
intriguing nding is that we nd no e¤ect on investment of the tax advantage for
debt nance associated with the deductibility of interest payments.
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Figure 1: Average capital-output ratio (in logs): manufacturing industries
33
Figure 2: Average relative price of assets (in logs): manufacturing industries
34
Figure 3: Average tax component of the user cost of capital (in logs): manufacturing
industries
35
Figure 4: Average capital-output ratio and the measured components of the user
cost of capital (in logs): manufacturing industries
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Figure 5: Simulated e¤ects of a 10 percent reduction in the user cost on the capital-
output ratio: equipment
Note: The simulated path is shown for an average country-sector pair, based on the
Pooled Mean Group results summarised in Column 3 of Table 9.
37
38 
 
Table 1: Within-groups estimations: baseline specification with CRS restriction 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures 
Panel A    ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ )𝑡−2 -0.027*** -0.056*** -0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−2 -0.028*** -0.065*** -0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 0.484***           0.393*** 0.549*** 
 (0.033) (0.064) (0.030) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.067*** 0.114*** 0.021*** 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.006) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 0.054*** 0.089*** 0.026*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡 -0.071*** -0.126*** -0.013*** 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.004) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 -0.049*** -0.092*** -0.018*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) 
Panel B: LR coefficient    ln𝑈𝐶 (𝛼2) -1.053*** -1.153*** -0.988*** 
 (0.118) (0.096) (0.174) 
Panel C: Tests (p-value)    
𝛼1 = 1 0.000 0.035 0.000 
𝛼2 = −1 0.648 0.116 0.947 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 154 154 154 
Observations 3146 3143 3141 
𝑅2 0.471 0.396 0.448 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Within-groups estimations without the CRS restriction 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures 
Panel A    ln𝐾𝑡−2 -0.034*** -0.061*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) ln𝑄𝑡−2 0.024*** 0.050*** 0.009*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−2 -0.027*** -0.062*** -0.009*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 0.484*** 0.393*** 0.548*** 
 (0.034) (0.065) (0.030) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.066*** 0.111*** 0.020*** 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.006) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 0.052*** 0.085*** 0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡 -0.070*** -0.124*** -0.011*** 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.004) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 -0.047*** -0.088*** -0.016*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.004) 
Panel B: LR coefficients    ln𝑄 (𝛼1) 0.702*** 0.828*** 0.400*** 
 (0.088) (0.081) (0.112) ln𝑈𝐶 (𝛼2) -0.788*** -1.012*** -0.414*** 
 (0.117) (0.112) (0.116) 
Panel C: Tests (p-value)    
𝛼1 = 1 0.000 0.035 0.000 
𝛼2 = −1 0.076 0.909 0.000 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 154 154 154 
Observations 3146 3143 3141 
𝑅2 0.473 0.397 0.452 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Within-groups estimations with country-sector specific trends 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures 
Panel A    ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ )𝑡−2 -0.091*** -0.160*** -0.047*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−2 -0.060*** -0.133*** -0.021*** 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.005) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 0.351***           0.226*** 0.427*** 
 (0.039) (0.071) (0.035) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.100*** 0.159*** 0.039*** 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.007) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 0.102*** 0.162*** 0.050*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡 -0.078*** -0.130*** -0.012*** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.004) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 -0.064*** -0.114*** -0.017*** 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.004) 
Panel B: LR coefficient    ln𝑈𝐶 (𝛼2) -0.654*** -0.832*** -0.444*** 
 (0.092 ) (0.067) (0.141) 
Panel C: Test (p-value)    
𝛼2 = −1 0.000  0.012 0.000 
Year dummies 
Country-sector linear trends 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No. of groups 154 154 154 
Observations 3146 3143 3141 
𝑅2 0.520  0.475  0.492 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Within-groups estimations: decomposing the user cost of capital 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures 
Panel A    ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ )𝑡−2 -0.026*** -0.055*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) ln(𝑃𝐾 𝑃)⁄ 𝑡−2 -0.027*** -0.062*** -0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−2 -0.023*** -0.095*** 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.004) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 0.484*** 0.387*** 0.544*** 
 (0.033) (0.064) (0.030) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.070*** 0.118*** 0.024*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.006) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 0.054*** 0.089*** 0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) 
∆ ln(𝑃𝐾 𝑃)⁄ 𝑡 -0.080*** -0.142*** -0.017*** 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.005) 
∆ ln(𝑃𝐾 𝑃)⁄ 𝑡−1 -0.051*** -0.097*** -0.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) 
∆ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 -0.029** -0.045* 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.024) (0.006) 
∆ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 -0.032** -0.059* -0.000 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.006) 
Panel B: LR coefficients    ln(𝑃𝐾 𝑃⁄ )  -1.049*** -1.111*** -1.143*** 
 (0.129) (0.096) (0.184) ln𝑇𝐴𝑋 -0.917*** -1.709*** 0.107 
 (0.312) (0.357) (0.317) 
Panel C: Test (p-value)    
Equal LR coefficients 0.698 0.101 0.002 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 154 154 154 
Observations 3146 3143 3141 
𝑅2 0.473 0.400 0.450 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Within-groups estimations: additional tax variables 
 Total capital Equipment Structures 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LR coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 ln(𝑃𝐾 𝑃⁄ )  -1.034*** -1.007*** -1.105*** -1.097*** -1.151*** -1.162*** 
 (0.128) (0.132) (0.097) (0.097) (0.185) (0.174) ln𝑇𝐴𝑋  -4.529*** -2.456*** -2.281*** -2.109*** -0.843 -1.435*** 
 (1.187) (0.512) (0.775) (0.456) (1.690) (0.480) 
EATR 4.557***  0.674  1.467  
 (1.532)  (0.738)  (2.672)  
𝜏 
 
1.838*** 
 
0.380 
 
2.690*** 
 
 
(0.490) 
 
(0.293) 
 
(0.614) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Observations 3143 3143 3143 3143 3141 3141 
𝑅2 0.476 0.476 0.401 0.401 0.451 0.453 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3 Short-run dynamics are included in the specifications. 
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Table 6: Within-groups estimations: debt finance 
           (1) (2) (3) 
LR coefficients    Total capital Equipment Structures 
Panel A    ln  𝑈𝐶 -1.062*** -1.171*** -1.076*** 
 (0.125) (0.099) (0.176) ln(1 − 𝐽
𝑀
) -0.096 -0.090 -0.304*** 
 (0.095) (0.075) (0.090) 
Panel B     ln(𝑃𝐾 𝑃⁄ ) -1.041*** -1.120*** -1.147*** 
 (0.136) (0.099) (0.184) ln𝑇𝐴𝑋 -1.528*** -1.855*** -0.212 
 (0.533) (0.422) (0.463) ln(1 − 𝐽
𝑀
) -0.189 -0.010 -0.129 
 (0.149) (0.088) (0.113) 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3 Year dummies and short-run dynamics are included in the specifications. 
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Table 7: Within-groups estimations: with country-specific year dummies 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures 
Panel A    ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ )𝑡−2 -0.039*** -0.061*** -0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−2 -0.039*** -0.068*** -0.019*** 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.003) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 0.399*** 0.317*** 0.487*** 
 (0.040) (0.074) (0.029) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.055*** 0.084*** 0.020*** 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.006) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 0.051*** 0.079*** 0.022*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡 -0.066*** -0.108*** -0.023*** 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.005) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 -0.050*** -0.097*** -0.032*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.005) 
Panel B: LR coefficient    ln𝑈𝐶 (𝛼2) -0.994*** -1.129*** -1.028*** 
 (0.094) (0.100) (0.128) 
Panel C: Test (p-value)    
𝛼2 = −1 0.947 0.201 0.825 
Country-specific year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 154 154 154 
Observations 3146 3143 3141 
𝑅2 0.590 0.518 0.566 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: IV within-groups estimations, using tax components as instruments 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures Total capital Equipment Structures 
IVs ∆ ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 , ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 , ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−2 ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 , ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−2 
Panel A 
   
   ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ )𝑡−2 -0.026*** -0.053*** -0.013*** -0.026*** -0.045*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−2 -0.026*** -0.058*** -0.012*** -0.027*** -0.042*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 0.487*** 0.402*** 0.548*** 0.486*** 0.423*** 0.552*** 
 
(0.034) (0.066) (0.030) (0.035) (0.073) (0.030) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.058*** 0.091*** 0.019*** 0.059*** 0.037 0.038*** 
 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.006) (0.012) (0.027) (0.009) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 0.054*** 0.089*** 0.026*** 0.054*** 0.090*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡 -0.033*** -0.034 -0.003 -0.039 0.177* -0.084*** 
 
(0.011) (0.022) (0.006) (0.034) (0.094) (0.030) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 -0.051*** -0.097*** -0.017*** -0.050*** -0.109*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.004) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) 
Panel B: LR coefficient 
  
   ln𝑈𝐶 (𝛼2) -1.022*** -1.096*** -0.952*** -1.027*** -0.934*** -1.174*** 
 
(0.129) (0.103) (0.182) (0.136) (0.177) (0.154) 
Panel C: Tests (p-value) 
  
   
𝛼2 = −1   0.865 0.353 0.794 0.844 0.709 0.259 
Hansen test   0.788 0.013 0.004 0.496 0.151 0.285 
Under- 
identification  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weak 
identification 309.060 130.440 777.640 31.980 15.569 15.372 
(F-statistic) 
   
   
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Observations 3146 3143 3141 3146 3143 3141 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs. 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
3 In Panel C, we report the p-values of the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rank LM test of underidentification. 
We also report the F-statistics of the Cragg-Donald Wald test of weak identification of parameters for individual 
endogenous regressors. 
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Table 9: PMG and outlier-robust MG estimations: 14 countries 
 Demeaned Demeaned+T 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Average) coefficients PMG MG PMG MG 
Total capital     
-ϕ -0.212*** -0.258*** -0.392*** -0.437*** 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.024) (0.022) ln𝑈𝐶 -0.571*** -0.765*** -0.413*** -0.472*** 
 (0.022) (0.111) (0.019) (0.183) 
Equipment     
-ϕ -0.222*** -0.258*** -0.382*** -0.431*** 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.024) (0.019) ln𝑈𝐶 -0.900*** -0.765*** -0.889*** -0.628*** 
 (0.025) (0.111) (0.026) (0.116) 
Structures     
-ϕ -0.139*** -0.177*** -0.334*** -0.364*** 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.026) (0.021) ln𝑈𝐶 -0.445*** -0.367*** -0.040*** -0.288*** 
 (0.026) (0.145) (0.017) (0.080) 
1 We estimate the parsimonious model ∆ ln𝐾𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = −ϕ𝑖,𝑐[ln(𝐾/𝑄)𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2 − 𝛼2𝑖,𝑐 ln𝑈𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2] +𝛽0𝑖,𝑐 ∆ln𝐾𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑖,𝑐 ∆ln𝑄𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 − 𝛽3𝑖,𝑐 ∆ln𝑈𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖,𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 using demeaned data, with and without linear 
trends (T). 
2 For the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators, we report the common long-run elasticity of the 
capital-output ratio with respect to the user cost of capital (α2), and the mean estimate of the convergence rate   
(-ϕ) across country-industry pairs. 
3 For the Mean Group (MG) estimators, we report outlier-robust estimates of the mean for each of these  
parameters across country-industry pairs. 
4 Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
5 *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1. 
6 Short-run dynamics are included in the specifications. 
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Table 10: Common correlated effects PMG and outlier-robust MG estimations: 11 countries 
 CCE CCE+T 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Average) coefficients PMG MG PMG MG 
Total capital     
-ϕ -0.124*** -0.144*** -0.126*** -0.159*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) ln𝑈𝐶 -0.431*** -0.494*** -0.731*** -0.441*** 
 (0.024) (0.256) (0.000) (0.159) 
Equipment     
-ϕ -0.176*** -0.194*** -0.274*** -0.234*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.038) (0.015) ln𝑈𝐶 -0.148*** -0.638*** -0.542*** -0.613*** 
 (0.004) (0.243) (0.000) (0.241) 
Structures     
-ϕ -0.057***  -0.058*** -0.110*** -0.102*** 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) ln𝑈𝐶 -0.046***  -0.098 -0.246*** -0.237 
 (0.016) (0.179) (0.002) (0.425) 
1 We estimate the parsimonious model ∆ ln𝐾𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = −ϕ𝑖,𝑐[ln(𝐾/𝑄)𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2 − 𝛼2𝑖,𝑐 ln𝑈𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−2] +𝛽0𝑖,𝑐 ∆ln𝐾𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑖,𝑐 ∆ln𝑄𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 − 𝛽3𝑖,𝑐 ∆ln𝑈𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾′𝑍𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖,𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 with and without linear trends (T), 
where the vector Zt includes the year-specific sample means of the dependent variable and each of the 
explanatory variables  
2 For the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators, we report the common long-run elasticity of the 
capital-output ratio with respect to the user cost of capital (α2), and the mean estimate of the convergence rate   
(-ϕ) across country-industry pairs. 
3 For the Mean Group (MG) estimators, we report outlier-robust estimates of the mean for each of these  
parameters across country-industry pairs. 
4 Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
5 *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1. 
6 Short-run dynamics are included in the specifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Derivation of the user cost of capital
A.1. Equity nance
In this Appendix, we derive the tax-adjusted user cost of capital for the case in
which investment is nanced by equity (retained prots or new share issues), as in
equation (2).
Allowing for corporate taxation, we write the net revenue (t) generated by the
rm in period t as
t = (1   t)PtF (Kt; Lt)  (1   tt)PKt It   (1   t)WtLt + eAt (A.9)
where F (Kt; Lt) denotes output (value-added) produced using capital (Kt) and
labour (Lt), Pt is the output price, It denotes real gross investment, PKt is the
price of capital goods, and Wt is the wage rate. Among the tax parameters,  t is
the statutory corporate income tax rate, t is the fraction of a unit of investment
spending that can be deducted from taxable prots in the same year, so that  tt
is the value of the rst year allowance on a unit of investment in period t, and eAt
is the value of writing-down allowances on past investments that can be claimed in
period t.
With no debt nance, we have
t = Dt  Nt (A.10)
where Dt denotes dividends paid in period t and Nt denotes revenue raised from
new share issues, so that t is also the net cash distribution to shareholders.
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Abstracting from personal taxation, this gives the value of the rm as
Vt = Et
" 1X
j=0
t+jt+j
#
(A.11)
where Et [:] denotes the conditional expectation based on information available in
period t, and t+j is the discount factor which gives the value in period t of an
expected payo¤ in period t + j. Letting rt denote the ex ante real discount rate
between period t and period t+1, and t denote the expected ination rate between
period t and period t + 1, the nominal discount rate (t) satises (1 + t) = (1 +
rt)(1 + t), and the nominal discount factors are given by
t = 1; t+1 =
1
1 + t
; t+j =
j 1Y
i=0
(1 + t+i)
 1 for j = 2; 3; ::: (A.12)
Following Hayashi (1982), we can also express the value of the rm as
Vt = Et
" 1X
j=0
t+j

t+j
#
+ Et
" 1X
j=0
t+jA

t+j
#
(A.13)
= V t + Et
" 1X
j=0
t+jA

t+j
#
where
t+j = (1   t+j)Pt+jF (Kt+j; Lt+j)  (1  At+j)PKt+jIt+j   (1   t+j)Wt+jLt+j,
(A.14)
At+j is the present value in period t+ j of current and future tax allowances asso-
ciated with a unit of new investment in period t+ j, and At+j is the component of
eAt+j associated with investments made before period t.
Choosing investment (It) in period t to maximise Vt is then equivalent to max-
imising V t , as the nal term in (A.13) does not depend on It. Here the optimisation
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problem can be written recursively as
V t (Kt 1) =

max
It
t (Kt; It) + t+1Et

V t+1 (Kt)

(A.15)
subject to the capital accumulation constraint
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It (A.16)
where  is the rate of depreciation. To ensure that the rms value maximisation
problem has a solution in the absence of adjustment costs, we assume that there is
some degree of monopolistic competition in the product market and the rm faces
a downward sloping demand curve for its output of the isoelastic form
Pt (Qt) = Q
  1

t (A.17)
where  > 1 is the price elasticity of demand. This gives
@t
@Kt
= (1   t)Pt

1  1


@Ft
@Kt
: (A.18)
Treating input prices as given, we also have
@t
@It
=  (1  At)PKt : (A.19)
Di¤erentiating equation (A.15) with respect to It yields
@V t
@It
=
@t
@Kt
+
@t
@It
+ t+1Et

@V t+1
@Kt

= 0 (A.20)
and di¤erentiating equation (A.15) with respect to Kt 1 yields
@V t
@Kt 1
= (1  ) @

t
@Kt
+ (1  ) t+1Et

@V t+1
@Kt

:
(A.21)
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Combining equations (A.20) and (A.21), we obtain
@V t
@Kt 1
=   (1  ) @

t
@It
(A.22)
and hence
t+1Et

@V t+1
@Kt

=   (1  ) t+1Et

@t+1
@It+1

: (A.23)
Substituting (A.18), (A.19), and (A.23) into equation (A.20), we can rearrange
the rst-order condition for optimal investment to obtain
@Ft
@Kt
=
PKt (1  At)
Pt(1  1 ) (1   t)

1  (1  )t+1Et

PKt+1(1  At+1)
PKt (1  At)

:
(A.24)
Assuming that relative prices, ination rates, tax rates and tax depreciation
schedules are expected to remain constant, we have Et[PKt+1(1 At+1)=PKt (1 At)] =
1 + t. In this case equation (A.24) simplies to give a familiar expression for the
tax-adjusted user cost of capital, similar to Jorgenson (1963), Hall and Jorgenson
(1967) and Devereux and Gri¢ th (2003), as:39
@Ft
@Kt
=
PKt
Pt

1  1

 (1  At)
(1   t)
(rt + )
(1 + rt)
= Ct; (A.25)
which is equation (2) in the text.
Finally for the CES production function
Qt = F (Kt; Lt) = (aKK

t + aLL

t )

 ;
39Jorgenson (1963), Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and Devereux and Gri¢ th (2003) assume that
rms take output prices as given, so they have

1  1

= 1: We assume that investment in
period t generates additional output in period t, while Devereux and Gri¢ th (2003) assume that
investment in period t generates additional output only in period t + 1: This timing di¤erence
accounts for the additional term (1 + rt) in the denominator of equation (A.25).
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where  = 1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution and  is the returns to scale,
we have
@Ft
@Kt
= aKQ
1
 (+
1 
 )
t K
 1

t : (A.26)
Combining equations (A.25) and (A.26) then gives an expression for the optimal
capital stock in this case as:
Kt = (aK)
Q
(+ 1  )
t C
 
t ;
which has the form of equation (1) in the text.
A.2. Debt nance
In this Appendix, we derive the tax-adjusted user cost of capital for the case in
which investment is nanced by borrowing, as in equation (3).
Following Devereux and Gri¢ th (2003), we assume that investment spending
in period t, net of tax allowances claimed in period t, is completely nanced by
borrowing the amount (1    tt)PKt It in period t, at a nominal interest rate it.
This borrowing is repaid in period t + 1, with the interest payment deductible
against the corporate tax, giving a cash outow of (1   tt)PKt It[1 + it(1   t+1)]
in period t + 1. Either no borrowing occurs in later periods or, if it does, the
amounts borrowed in later periods do not depend on the choice of It.40 With these
assumptions, we have
t = (1   t)PtF (Kt; Lt)  (1  At)PKt It   (1   t)WtLt + (1   tt)PKt It
40In particular, the change in investment that is required in period t+ 1 to hold Kt+1 constant,
when considering a change in It and hence in Kt, is assumed not to be nanced by borrowing.
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t+1 = (1   t+1)Pt+1F (Kt+1; Lt+1)  (1  At+1)PKt+1It+1   (1   t+1)Wt+1Lt+1
 (1   tt)PKt It[1 + it(1   t+1)]
and t+j unchanged from that given in equation (A.14) above from period t + 2
onwards.
Using the same simplifying assumptions noted in Appendix A.1 above, the rst-
order condition for optimal investment can then be rearranged to give:
@Ft
@Kt
=
PKt
Pt

1  1

 (1  At)
(1   t)
(rt + )
(1 + rt)
  [t   it(1   t)](1   tt)
(1   t)(1 + t)

=
PKt
Pt

1  1

 (1  At)
(1   t)
(rt + )
(1 + rt)

1  Jt
Mt

= Ct

1  Jt
Mt

= CDebtt
as in equation (3) in the text, where
Jt = [t   it(1   t)](1   tt) and Mt = (1  At) (rt + ) (1 + t):
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Appendix B: List of industries and countries
 Sample 1: 11 manufacturing industries
This sample includes the following manufacturing industries: 1) Basic metals
and fabricated metal; 2) chemicals, rubber, plastics and fuel; 3) electrical and optical
equipment; 4) food, beverages and tobacco; 5) machinery not elsewhere classied;
6) manufacturing not elsewhere classied and recycling; 7) other non-metallic min-
erals; 8) pulp, paper and printing; 9) textiles, leather and footwear; 10) transport
equipment; 11) wood and cork.
 Sample 2: 19 industries
This sample includes the 11 manufacturing industries in sample 1, plus the
following sectors: 12) agriculture, hunting, forestry and sh; 13) mining and quar-
rying; 14) construction; 15) wholesale and retail trade; 16) hotels and restaurants;
17) transport and storage; 18) real estate; 19) post and telecommunications.
 Sample 3: 27 industries.
In addition to the 19 industries included in sample 2, we include the following
sectors: 20) electricity, gas and water supply; 21) nancial intermediation; 22)
education; 23) public administration, defence and compulsory social security; 24)
health and social work; 25) other community, social and personal services; 26)
private households with employed persons; 27) extra-territorial organisations and
bodies.
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 Country coverage
Country Coverage Country Coverage
Australia 1982-2007 Italy 1982-2007
Austria 1982-2007 Japan 1982-2006
Czech Republic 1995-2007 Netherlands 1982-2007
Denmark 1986-2007 Spain 1982-2007
Finland 1995-2007 Sweden 1993-2007
France 1982-2007 UK 1982-2007
Germany 1991-2007 US 1982-2007
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Appendix C: EU KLEMS and OECD STAN
Figure C.1: Total real capital stock (in logs): total manufacturing industry
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Appendix D: Time-series plots for individual countries
Figure D.1: Average K/Q ratio and user cost of capital (in logs): total capital
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Figure D.2: Average K/Q ratio and user cost of capital (in logs): equipment
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Table E.1: Panel unit-root test results (p-values): 14 countries, 11 manufacturing industries 
 Total capital Equipment Structures 
Raw data    ln𝐾 0.000 0.000 0.000 ln𝑄 0.011 0.011 0.011 ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ ) 0.008 0.002 0.007 ln𝑈𝐶 0.150 0.000 0.382 ln (𝑃𝐾 𝑃⁄ ) 0.044 0.000 0.999 ln𝑇𝐴𝑋 0.000 0.000 0.048 
    
With linear trends    ln𝐾 0.539 0.998 0.135 ln𝑄 0.266 0.266 0.266 ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ ) 0.008 0.058 0.016 ln𝑈𝐶 0.258 0.000 0.124 ln (𝑃𝐾 𝑃⁄ ) 0.021 0.000 0.920 ln𝑇𝐴𝑋 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Demeaned data      ln𝐾 1.000 1.000 1.000 ln𝑄 1.000 1.000 1.000 ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ ) 0.000 0.025 0.000 ln𝑈𝐶 0.555 0.000 0.002 ln (𝑃𝐾 𝑃⁄ ) 0.891 0.000 0.003 ln𝑇𝐴𝑋 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Demeaned data with linear trends   ln𝐾 1.000 1.000 1.000 ln𝑄 1.000 1.000 1.000 ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ ) 0.000 0.000 0.001 ln𝑈𝐶 0.056 0.000 0.002 ln (𝑃𝐾 𝑃⁄ ) 0.035 0.000 0.308 ln𝑇𝐴𝑋 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Note: This table presents p-values from the Fisher-type test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels (Maddala and 
Wu, 1999). Suppose the stochastic process, 𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡, is generated by an autoregressive process: 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝑗=1𝑝 𝛾𝑖,𝑗∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑡 is a linear trend. The null hypothesisis is H₀: 𝛽𝑖 =0 for all i, and the alternative is H₁:  𝛽𝑖<0,i=1,2,...N₁,  𝛽𝑖=0, i=N₁+1,N₁+2,...N, 0<𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑁→∞ (N₁/N)≤1. The Fisher test first computes the p-value 𝜋𝑖  for each group 
using the Phillips-Perron unit-root test. Then it computes the statistic -2∑log𝜋𝑖, which follows a 𝜒² distribution 
with 2N degrees of freedom under the null. We report the p-values of the χ² statistics in this table. Results are 
reported for the lag length p=3, but are not highly sensitive to this choice. ‘Demeaned’ series are expressed as 
deviations from year-specific sample means, where these means are calculated using observations for all 
available groups in that year. These tests are computed using the command xtfisher in Stata. 
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Table E.2: Within-groups estimations: baseline specification, 19 industries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures 
Panel A    ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ )𝑡−2 -0.019*** -0.046*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−2 -0.010*** -0.048*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 0.591*** 0.487*** 0.587*** 
 (0.022) (0.038) (0.025) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.058*** 0.108*** 0.023*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.004) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 0.042*** 0.075*** 0.030*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡 -0.031*** -0.109*** -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 -0.020*** -0.068*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) 
Panel B: LR coefficient    ln𝑈𝐶 (𝛼2) -0.524*** -1.041*** -0.657*** 
 (0.131) (0.102) (0.145) 
Panel C: Test (p-value)    
𝛼2 = −1 0.000 0.690 0.019 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 266 265 266 
Observations 5608 5609 5657 
𝑅2 0.494 0.447 0.450 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E.3: Within-groups estimations: baseline specification, 27 industries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures 
Panel A    ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ )𝑡−2 -0.020*** -0.050*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−2 -0.010*** -0.055*** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 0.575*** 0.470*** 0.587*** 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.053) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.056*** 0.111*** 0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 0.048*** 0.077*** 0.037*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡 -0.027*** -0.119*** -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 -0.026*** -0.069*** -0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Panel B: LR coefficient    ln𝑈𝐶 (𝛼2) -0.513*** -1.102*** -0.396*** 
 (0.104) (0.076) (0.255) 
Panel C: Test (p-value)    
𝛼2 = −1 0.000 0.180 0.019 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 351 349 351 
Observations 7417 7345 7469 
𝑅2 0.473 0.439 0.426 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E.4: First-stage regression results for Table 8: dependent variable ∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures Total capital Equipment Structures 
Instruments    
 ∆ ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡  1.078*** 1.078*** 1.104***    
 
(0.046) (0.061) (0.030)       ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 0.150***  0.114**  0.343*** -0.214*** -0.129**  -0.119** 
 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.086) (0.055) (0.056) (0.047) ln𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−2   -0.091** 0.004  -0.131***  -0.019  -0.056  -0.026  
 
( 0.045) (0.040) (0.046) (0.046) (0.041) (0.051) ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ )𝑡−2 -0.001 -0.025 -0.039*** -0.022 -0.036*** -0.055*** 
 
( 0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−2 -0.016  -0.058*** -0.085*** -0.029** -0.064*** -0.079*** 
 
(0.014 ) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 -0.043  -0.114** 0.061 -0.045 -0.097* 0.112 
 
(0.083) (0.049) (0.083) (0.089) (0.049) (0.089) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.264*** 0.261*** 0.245 0.249*** 0.253*** 0.226*** 
 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 -0.005  -0.019 0.067 -0.005 -0.006 0.048   (0.024) (0.021) (0.032) (0.026) (0.023) (0.037) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 0.043  0.053* -0.147** 0.063* 0.068** -0.079*** 
 
( 0.030) (0.031) (0.063) (0.033) (0.032) (0.073) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Observations 3146 3143 3141 3146 3143 3141 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E.5: IV within-groups estimations, using lagged user cost as instruments 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures 
IVs  ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−3 , ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−4, ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−5, ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−6  
Panel A 
   ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ )𝑡−2 -0.035*** -0.064*** -0.039*** 
 
(0.005) (0.012) (0.013) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−2 -0.036*** -0.072*** -0.060*** 
 
(0.006) (0.015) (0.021) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 0.451*** 0.348*** 0.515*** 
 
(0.036) (0.074) (0.048) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.096*** 0.126*** 0.089** 
 
(0.017) (0.039) (0.043) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 0.060*** 0.085*** 0.061** 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.025) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡 -0.191*** -0.185 -0.314* 
 
(0.062) (0.182) (0.173) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 -0.047*** -0.092*** -0.062* 
 
(0.009) (0.022) (0.032) 
Panel B: LR coefficient 
   ln𝑈𝐶 (𝛼2) -1.046*** -1.129*** -1.521*** 
 
(0.131) (0.122) (0.295) 
Panel C: Test (p-value) 
   𝛼2 = 1 0.727 0.290 0.077 
Hansen test 0.315 0.095 0.255 
Under-identification  0 0 0 
Weak identification 8.907 4.218 1.518 
(F-statistic) 
   Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 154 154 154 
Observations 2530 2523 2524 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3 In Panel C, we report the p-values of the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rank LM test of underidentification. 
We also report the F statistics of the Cragg-Donald Wald test of weak identification of parameters for individual 
endogenous regressors. 
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Table E.6: First-stage regression results for Table E.5: dependent variable ∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total capital Equipment Structures 
Instruments    ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−3 0.151*** 0.092*** 0.028 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.027) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−4 -0.082** -0.019 0.001 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.025) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−5  0.055 0.019 -0.013 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.024) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−6  -0.062** -0.034 -0.020 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.019) ln(𝐾 𝑄⁄ )𝑡−2 -0.018  -0.036*** -0.068*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−2 -0.107***  -0.126***  -0.140*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) 
∆ ln𝐾𝑡−1 -0.040  -0.048  0.003  
 (0.103) (0.055) (0.089) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡 0.238*** 0.230***  0.217***  
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) 
∆ ln𝑄𝑡−1 0.052* 0.010  0.114*** 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.036) 
∆ ln𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 0.023  0.091*** -0.153*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.060) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 154 154 154 
Observations 2530 2523 2524 
1 Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered over time within country-industry pairs 
2 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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